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Abstract
We provide an equilibrium multi-asset pricing model with micro-founded systemic
risk and heterogeneous investors. Systemic risk arises due to excessive leverage and
risk taking induced by free-riding externalities. Global risk-sensitive financial regula-
tions are introduced with a view of tackling systemic risk, with Value-at-Risk a key
component. The model suggests that risk-sensitive regulation can lower systemic risk
in equilibrium, at the expense of poor risk-sharing, an increase in risk premia, higher
and asymmetric asset volatility, lower liquidity, more comovement in prices, and the
chance that markets may not clear.
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1 Introduction
There is still a sizable gap between the literature on equilibrium asset pricing models and
the real world. We would like to point out two major contributing factors for this lack of
realism. First, markets are neither complete nor frictionless. A large body of literature has
studied asset pricing under incomplete markets as well as under various frictions, such as
portfolio constraints. Much less work has been done when financial institutions are sub-
jected to risk-sensitive constraints. Risk sensitive regulation, where statistical risk models
are used to determine allowable levels of risk and of bank capital, has recently become
the cornerstone of international financial regulations. Given the compulsory nature of the
Basel-II prescriptions, asset prices, allocations and welfare will all be strongly affected by
risk sensitive regulation. As a result, standard frictionless asset pricing methodologies may
no longer be appropriate.
Second, very few, if any, equilibrium models provide micro-foundations for the risk under-
lying said risk-sensitive regulation. While some papers, for instance see Basak and Shapiro
(2001)1 and Cuoco and Liu (2005), model asset pricing in a risk-regulated world, that
world is by assumption first-best and would therefore not warrant any regulation in the
first place. The rationale for regulating risk must lie in the fear of what has been called a
systemic event. Empirically, such an event seems to be priced in the markets. For instance,
the implied distribution of post-’87 out-of-the money put options is substantially negatively
skewed (consult Bates (2000), Pan (2002) and Carr and Wu (2003) who argue that this is
due to the fear of substantial negative return jumps). While modelling a systemic crash
as an exogenous shock may be useful in practice, in the absence of any market failure it
is nevertheless not clear why this would require regulation. It is also not clear what a
systemic event is in the first place (see De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000, for a survey). For
concreteness we provide a formal definition of a systemic event.
Our task in this simple model with a continuum of agents (with varying coefficients of risk
aversion and heterogeneous in their regulatory status: while some are regulated others may
not be) is to formalize our intuition about systemic events that are due to an externality-
induced free-riding market failure. Investors face random asset endowments. Being indi-
vidually negligible they disregard the effects of their actions on aggregate outcomes. As
a result in equilibrium an excessive fraction of total risk is concentrated on a small but
significant number of highly leveraged investors, that is investors who borrow large sums by
shorting the riskless asset and investing those sums in the risky assets. In turn, it suffices
that an unanticipated event transforms this imbalance between those agents who own the
1Basak and Shapiro are foremost interested in modelling the optimal dynamic portfolio process of a
regulated investor in complete Brownian markets and under various forms of constraints. They find for
instance that in the worst states, regulated investors may take on more risk than non-regulated investors
and consequently increase the stock market volatility in an economy with two log-utility agents, one of
which is regulated. We find a similar result driven by agent heterogeneity.
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shares and those agents who have spare investable capital into a systemic crisis.
More concretely, we model assets as rights to the output stream of firms, as in (a static
version of) Lucas (1978). Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we introduce an in-
termediate date at which firms may face a sudden (perfectly correlated across firms, i.e.
aggregate) liquidity need. In order to keep the production process going, the existing share-
holders are asked to provide liquidity to the firms by lending them an amount of riskless
assets proportional to their shares in the firms. This sudden demand for additional working
capital conveys no information as to the worth of the firm. We can view this stage either
as pre-bankruptcy deliberations or as a stylized rights issue. The liquidity is reimbursed
to them at date 1 with interest, provided that the productive sector was able to raise
sufficient liquidity. Refinancing may fail since the holders of large equity positions may
not themselves have the required incentives to accumulate enough liquidity to lend to the
firms. In this paper the frictions consist of the assumptions that a) the productive sector
must be refinanced as a whole (the outputs of the various firms are also inputs into each
other, say), and b) that markets are closed at the intermediate date. This assumption
is both theoretically and empirically reasonable. The initial investors, much like venture
capitalists, gather private information about the projects they are investing in, or are at
least perceived as doing so. This asymmetry might make fire-selling the project and/or
attracting short-term liquidity from third parties impossible. The probability of a systemic
crash increases along with imbalances in agents’ leverage and risk taking. We measure
systemic risk by the degree of imbalance of risk taking and leverage among agents.
Systemic risk therefore arises due to externalities and does warrant regulation. How suc-
cessful are risk-sensitive regulations of the VaR type? Our model demonstrates that regu-
latory risk constraints lower the risk of a systemic event in equilibrium by preventing some
regulated investors from accumulating excessively levered risky positions. Even though in
equilibrium this means that more risk is held by risk-tolerant unregulated investors, equi-
librium prices adjust in a way as to guarantee that even the unregulated investors, while
holding more risk, also hold commensurately more of the safe asset.
But risk-sensitive regulations do impose social costs as well. First, risk-sensitive regulations
may prevent market clearing in some circumstances if all financial institutions are regulated.
The probability of markets not clearing increases with the tightness of the risk constraint.
The basic intuition is that in periods of stress, such as with large fire-sales, the risk that
would have to be taken on by the buyers could violate all potential buyers’ regulatory
constraints. Since non-diversifiable aggregate risk needs to be held at an equilibrium,
no equilibrium can exist. No matter how cheap the risky assets are, regulated financial
institutions face binding risk constraints and cannot buy more risky assets at any price.
We show that there is a set of states for which there is no market clearing equilibrium. We
also exhibit a set of states where equilibria exist but where prices and real allocations are
indeterminate (nominal and real indeterminacy).
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Second, the feedback-effects of regulation on the behaviour of prices are also important in
and by themselves. We demonstrate that the equilibrium pricing function in a regulated
economy exhibits, as regulation becomes tighter, less depth and more volatility (the covari-
ance matrix is more positive definite, meaning that any portfolio of assets is more volatile).
The fundamental intuition behind these results rests in the endogenous equilibrium level
of risk-aversion in the market as a result of agent heterogeneity. The regulatory constraint
causes the pricing function to become more concave for typical trades, since risk will have
to be transferred from the more risk-tolerant to the more risk-averse. In order for the more
risk-averse to take on the additional risk, the discount will have to be bigger the more
risk-averse the marginal buyers are. Hence for a given change in demand, prices move
more with regulation than without, implying higher (local) volatility and lower liquidity
post regulation.
A well known source of major financial losses is the fact that correlations or comovements
of assets are amplified in times of stress. While margin calls and wealth effects have been
among the proposed explanations, as in Kyle and Xiong (2001), we are not aware of any
models that are able to generate increased comovements in periods of stress from the reg-
ulatory constraints. Our model suggests that one of the explanations for the observed
state-dependent comovement may be the impact of risk constraints on portfolio optimiza-
tion, especially in times of stress. Even in the absence of wealth effects and even if assets
have independent payoffs and independent demand innovations, sufficiently strict regula-
tions will cause some agents to adjust their risk position by scaling down their holdings in
the risky assets, thereby introducing comovements. This effect will be most pronounced
during financial crises. As a result, a Basel style regulation introduces the potential for an
endogenous increase in correlation, thereby decreasing the agents ability to diversify and in-
creasing the severity of financial crises. Financial institutions therefore require equilibrium
risk premia that are higher than predicted by frictionless models.
2 The Model
Our economy is based upon a standard two-dates constant absolute risk–aversion model
without asymmetric information and with a stochastic asset supply. There are two families
of agents: regulated financial institutions (RFI) that are subjected to regulatory risk con-
straints (e.g. banks) and unregulated institutions (UFI) (e.g. hedge funds). The standard
two-dates model is extended by adding an intermediate date, date one, to it. At date
zero the UFIs and RFIs invest their (random) endowments in both risky and “riskless”
(a zero-coupon bond) assets. Consumption occurs at date two. We follow common mod-
elling practice by endowing financial institutions with their own utility functions (such as
in Basak and Shapiro, 2001). At the intermediate date one, as further explained below, a
refinancing need may arise, which we refer to as a liquidity event.
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There are N nonredundant risky assets that promise, in the absence of any liquidity event,
normally distributed payoffs d ∼ N
(
µˆ, Σˆ
)
at date two, independent of the random en-
dowments of assets.2 The hats indicate payoffs, returns (. . . , di/qi, . . . ) are distributed as
N(µ,Σ). Asset 0 is the “riskless asset” and promises to pay off the deterministic amount
d0, except in a systemic event, defined as a liquidity event at which refinancing fails due
to the actions taken by investors, when the payoff is zero. Asset payoffs and returns are
accordingly conditionally, but not unconditionally, normally distributed. The event tree
may be represented schematically as:
Insert figure 1 here
Each FI is characterized by its type h, which determines risk-aversion and endowments,
and by its regulation status t, which is either t = {r} if the FI is regulated, or t = {u} if
it is unregulated. Each type of financial institution h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ] is characterized by a constant
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) αh as well as an initial endowment of the
riskless asset θh0 and of the risky assets θ˜
h
:= θh − ǫh, where ǫh represents the random
component of the endowments in the risky assets, with ǫ :=
∫ ℓ
ℓ
ǫhdh. For simplicity, we
assume that ǫh = ǫ
ℓ−ℓ
, that αh = h (but for clarity we still label agent h’s coefficient by
αh rather than by h only) and that all institutions are risk-averse, ℓ > 0. A fraction η(h)
of agents of each type h are regulated, the remaining fraction is unregulated. We impose
no restrictions on η, and none of the propositions in the paper depend qualitatively on
η, provided that a non-null subset of agents are regulated. A FI (h, t) invests its initial
wealth W h0 in a portfolio comprising both riskless and risky assets, (y
h,t
0 ,y
h,t). The time–
zero wealth of an agent of type h (regulated or unregulated) comprises initial endowments
in the riskless asset, θh0 , as well in risky assets, θ˜
h
, so that W h0 ≡ q0θh0 + q′θ˜
h
. The price
vector of risky assets is denoted by q. Since the time-zero budget constraint q0θ
h
0 + q
′θ˜
h ≥
q0y
h,t
0 + q
′yh,t is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, we can normalize, without loss of
generality, the price of the riskless asset to q0 ≡ 1, i.e. the riskless asset is used as the
time–zero nume´raire. We can write Rf := d0/q0 = d0 for the return on the riskless asset in
the absence of a systemic event. At date 2, the consumption commodity plays the role of
the nume´raire.
2Independence simplifies our analysis. If supply shocks were not independent of payoffs, then asset
prices would convey payoff-relevant information. The information extraction problem is easy to solve for
some parametric distributions, such as the normal distribution, but contributes little to the issues at hand
and does require additional parametric assumptions. Normality of payoffs may be at odds with option-like
derivative securities and should be viewed as an approximation over shorter periods in the presence of such
option-like derivatives. In any Brownian model, returns on derivatives are normal over short horizons.
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The aggregate amount of outstanding risky assets owned by investors is θ˜
a
:=
∫ ℓ
ℓ
θ˜
h
dh.
The random component ǫ is assumed to be distributed on E ⊂ RN according to the law
P
ǫ, for simplicity assumed to be independent of the law governing asset payoffs, Pd. In this
paper, we do not impose any assumptions upon the distribution of ǫ other than to assume
that its support E is open and convex, in order to occasionally apply differential calculus.
Instead of interpreting ǫ as noisy asset endowments, with the appropriate adjustments one
could interpret ǫ as noise trader supplies. Because the total endowment of risky assets
has to be absorbed by the UFIs and RFIs in equilibrium, prices depend upon ǫ. This is
the only role of stochastic asset endowments. In a dynamic version of our model where
dividends or news about the value of firms govern the resolution of uncertainty, they can
be dropped entirely, as in Danielsson et al. (2004).
The aim of the regulations for risk-taking is to control extreme risk-taking by individual
financial institutions. In theory, a large number of possible regulatory environments exist
for this purpose. In practice, we are not aware of any published research into the welfare
properties of alternative market risk regulatory methodologies,3 and as a result, we adopt
the standard market risk methodology, i.e., Value-at-Risk (VaR). The constraint takes the
form:4
P
[
(E[W h]−W h) ≥ V aR] ≤ p¯,
i.e. the probability of a loss larger than the uniform regulatory number V aR is no larger
than p¯. Each RFI maximizes the expected utility subject to both the budget constraint
and the VaR constraint by choosing the optimal asset holdings. In the next section, we go
into the details of how the liquidity events play out.
3Among those methodologies one could enumerate various schemes to explicitly limit risk-taking or
leverage, lending-of-last-resort practices, regulation of the admissible financial contracting practices with
a view of overcoming agency or free-riding problems, and so forth. Of course, we know from Artzner et al.
(1999) that VaR is not a desirable measure from a purely statistical point of view because it fails to be
subadditive. Furthermore, Ahn et al. (1999) show that the VaR measure may not be reliable because it
is easy for a financial institution to legitimately manage reported VaR through options. Alexander and
Baptista (2002) caution against using mean-VaR portfolio allocation as opposed to the standard mean-
variance analysis.
4We follow standard practice (as advocated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)
and by Jorion (2001) for instance) and use the relative VaR, i.e. the dollar loss relative to the mean (the
unexpected loss), rather than the absolute VaR, i.e. the dollar loss relative to the initial value. Over
short horizons the two coincide, but over longer horizons the relative VaR has proved more useful as it
appropriately accounts for the time value of money. Indeed, over large horizons, with many data-generating
processes calibrated to past data, the absolute VaR number would be swamped by the drift term.
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3 Modelling Systemic Crises
While many authors attribute systemic fragility to an excessive piling-on of debt (e.g.
Kindleberger (1978), Feldstein (1991)), those theories have relied explicitly or implicitly on
irrationality.5 In our model no such irrationality is required to generate excessive leverage,
which arises solely by the fact that the less risk-averse FIs are not bearing the full social
costs of their actions. Shares are rights to the output stream of firms. Firms may face a
sudden aggregate liquidity need (assumed to be independently distributed of payoffs and
demand innovations) which can only be satisfied by a further injection of capital (cash) from
the shareholders in proportion to the size of their existing share holdings. This liquidity
is reimbursed to them at date 1 with interest Rf , provided that the productive sector as
a whole is able to raise sufficient liquidity. Since each investor believes he is too small to
affect the aggregate allocation, and therefore whether the refinancing is successful or not,
he may have an incentive to disregard the social cost of his actions and accumulate an
excessively risky and leveraged position. What is an “excessive” level for a FI is specified
within the model, and depends on the actions of all other FIs.
Formally, assume that a liquidity event L occurred, and that each shareholder is asked
during the emergency meetings with the firms’ stakeholders to contribute to firm i Ki units
of the riskless asset per unit of asset i held, with K := (. . . , Ki, . . . ). This is similar to the
fixed costs assumption in Marshall (1998). While shareholders do not have to come to the
rescue of the productive sector by contributing working capital, it is a weakly dominant
strategy to do so. The total amount of riskless assets lent by (h, t) to the productive sector
is therefore the full amount K′yh,t if h has the required liquidity, yh,t0 ≥ K′yh,t, otherwise
yh,t0 only:
Lh,t := min{yh,t0 ,K′yh,t}
Defining Sh,t := K⊤yh,t − Lh,t, The financing shortfall stemming from investor (h, t) is:
Sh,t+ := max{0, Sh,t}
Aggregate shortfall S(ǫ, v¯) is defined as
S(ǫ, v¯) :=
∫ ℓ
ℓ
[η(h)Sh,r+ + (1− η(h))Sh,u+ ]dh
5Some authors have studied financial stability purely from a banking perspective. The bank-run lit-
erature (e.g. Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and subsequent work based thereon, e.g.
Gorton and Huang (2003)) exploits coordination problems between multiple equilibria, while the interbank
literature studies how shocks can be amplified through balance-sheet networks, such as Allen and Gale
(2000) and Cifuentes et al. (2005). The sunspots features in some of the coordination models have been
replaced by a unique equilibrium in the recent literature based on the global games concept (e.g. Carlsson
and Van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998)). Our model in contrast is market based rather than
banking based.
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Aggregate output collapses if refinancing fails, i.e. if the proceeds are too low, and each
investor’s consumption is at the survival level. The event “refinancing fails” is the event
that in aggregate S(ǫ, v¯) > S¯ for some S¯. Implicit in this definition is the idea that even
if working capital can be reallocated across firms at date one, there just is not enough
to sustain all firms’ production plans. The event (viewed as a measurable subset of E)
whereby a latent refinancing imbalance S(ǫ, v¯) > S¯ exists at equilibrium is denoted by Fv¯.
When no ambiguity arises, we simply denote it by F.
The assumption that output completely collapses is made for simplicity only and reflects
a strongly interdependent production sector. While none of our main results depend on a
precise micro foundation for such an interdependent sector, for the sake of concreteness we
outline one such economy. Before nature chooses whether there will be a liquidity shock
or not, each firm i is in the process of producing a heterogeneous intermediate output.
We say that the production sector is strongly interdependent if the intermediate input-
output matrix is symmetric, indecomposable and if every intermediate input of any firm
i is crucial (meaning that the output of firm i is zero in case there is some intermediate
input in the input list Ii of firm i that is no longer supplied to i). Indecomposability is
a standing assumption in standard input-output analysis, see for instance Nikaido (1968).
Indecomposability and cruciality are equivalent here to requiring that for any two firms
i and j, there is a sequence of distinct firms {k1 = i, k2, . . . , kn−1, kn = j} such that a
minimal amount of intermediate output by j is required as an intermediate input in the
production of intermediate output kn−1, and a minimal amount of of intermediate output
kn−1 in turn is required as an intermediate input in the production of kn−2 and so forth
all the way up to i. Any two sectors are directly or indirectly linked in this way. If Ii is
the list of firms whose intermediate inputs are required in the production of intermediate
output i, then the output of intermediate output i is (here d = (. . . , di, . . . ) is the normally
distributed random payoff variable introduced above,
∏
is the product operator and 1event
stands for the indicator function which equals 1 if the event is true and zero otherwise):
intermediate outputi = e
di1{Qj∈Ii intermediate outputj>0}
Before the intermediate outputs can be shipped, nature determines whether a liquidity
shock occurs or not. If the liquidity shock occurs and refinancing fails for at least some
firm j, then intermediate outputj = 0, and the intermediate outputs of all firms collapse.
We might interpret the aggregate nature of the liquidity shock as consisting of necessary
investments into the transportation network for inputs between firms. A shortfall larger
than S¯ represents the event whereby at least one link of the transportation network is
no longer operational due to underinvestment. If refinancing succeeds, then intermediate
outputi = e
di , all firms i. The intermediate output is then in a second production phase
transformed into the homogeneous consumable final output via the production function
final outputi = ln(intermediate outputi)
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If some firm fails to refinance itself (or if some transportation link fails to receive adequate
investments), then by strong interdependence all final outputs are −∞ and each investor’s
consumption is normalized to be equal to some arbitrarily small survival amount xh,t =
x > −∞, all h, t ∈ {u, r}.6 To summarize,
L and F ⇒ xh,t = x a.s., all h, t ∈ {u, r}
Definition 1 (Systemic Crash, Normal Market Conditions) We define a systemic
crash (or a systemic event or collapse) as the event L ∩ F. The ex-ante probability of a
systemic event is P(L ∩ F) = P(L)P(F).
Normal market conditions are defined as the event N := (L∩F)c which obtains with ex-ante
probability P(N) = 1− P(L ∩ F).
Notice that probabilities depend on v¯ as well as on the chosen distribution of risk among
the agents.
4 The Decision Problem of the Financial Institutions
The RFI’s program consists in choosing demand schedules to solve the following program.
Problem 1 (Risk-Constrained Program)
max
{(yh,yh
0
)}
P(L ∩ F|ǫ)uh(x) + (1− P(L ∩ F|ǫ))E[uh(xh)‖N, ǫ]
subject to yh0 + q
′yh ≤ θh0 + q′θ˜
h
xh = W h := d′yh +RfL
h +Rf (y
h
0 − Lh) = d′yh +Rfyh0
P
[
(E[W h|ǫ]−W h) ≥ V aR‖ǫ] ≤ p¯
Since individual institutions are negligible, this formulation gives rise to the free-riding
externality mentioned above. Each financial institution chooses to neglect the effect of
their actions on P(L∩F|ǫ). Rationality on behalf of the investor requires that he correctly
learns from ǫh and q in equilibrium. Of course, since ǫh fully reveals ǫ, q is uninformative
given ǫh. The investor therefore knows whether a critical latent imbalance is built up or
not. What he does not know is whether a liquidity event obtains that would turn the
known latent imbalance into a systemic crisis.
6As usual in the CARA-normal setting, the consumption set is unbounded below and equals R ∪
{−∞,+∞}. The least desirable bundle –“the collapse of the productive sector”– is therefore effectively
−∞, and x is an arbitrary small number, i.e. negative with |x| arbitrarily large.
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Consider the auxiliary program where it is known that a systemic crash is impossible.
Payoffs and returns are then normally distributed, and a sufficient statistic for portfolio
risk is the volatility of W h. The VaR constraint can therefore be stated as an exogenous
upper bound v¯ on portfolio variance,7
yh
′
Σˆyh ≤ v¯ (1)
The auxiliary program can be written:
max
{(yh,yh
0
)}
E[uh(xh)|N, ǫ]
subject to yh0 + q
′yh ≤ θh0 + q′θ˜
h
xh = W h ≡ d′yh +RfLh +Rf (yh0 − Lh) = d′yh +Rfyh0
yh
′
Σˆyh ≤ v¯
Suppose that at the equilibrium with the original program the investor knows that there
is no global imbalance, Fc. Then whether or not a liquidity event obtains, no systemic
crash can occur, and the solution to Program 1 coincides with the solution to the auxiliary
program. Next assume that the investor knows that F obtains. Since neither P(L ∩ F|ǫ)
nor uh(x) are affected by the actions of investor h, his objective function again coincides
with the one in the auxiliary program. The same is true for the VaR constraint:
P
[
(E[W h|ǫ]−W h) ≥ V aR‖ǫ] = P(L) ·0+(1−P(L))Pd [(Ed[W h|ǫ]−W h) ≥ V aR‖ǫ] ≤ p¯
This is the main role played by the assumption that crisis consumption x is exogenous as
it allows both two-fund separation and the given VaR constraint to hold even with the
possibility of a non-null systemic event. The solution to Program 1 coincides with the
solution to the auxiliary program, with p¯ replaced by p¯
(1−P(L))
. In the analysis that follows
we simply write p¯ with the understanding that it should be p¯/(1− P(L)) in case investors
know there is a latent imbalance. The solution to the investor’s problem is given by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Optimal Portfolio) The optimal portfolio of risky assets for RFI (h, t) has
the mean-variance form
yh,t =
1
αh + φh,t
Σˆ
−1
(µˆ− Rfq) (2)
7Indeed, denoting the cumulative standard normal distribution function by N(·), the VaR constraint
can be reduced to a volatility constraint: Pd
[
(Ed[Wh|ǫ]−Wh) ≥ V aR‖ǫ] ≤ p¯ iff N ( −V aR
Stdd(W h|ǫ)
)
≤ p¯ iff
Stdd(Wh‖ǫ) ≤ V aR−N−1(p¯) iff Vard(Wh|ǫ) ≤ v¯ :=
(
V aR
−N−1(p¯)
)2
.
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where φh,u := 0 and φh,r := 2λ
h,r
Ed[uh′(Wh)|ǫ]
≥ 0, with λh,r being the Lagrange multiplier of
the VaR constraint. The effective degree of risk-aversion, αh + φh,r, is independent of the
initial wealth W h0 and only depends on α
h, q and v¯.
A binding risk-regulation affects the portfolio through the effective degree of risk-aversion,
αh+φh,r. Whereas the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is constant for unrestricted FIs,
it is endogenous for the FIs subjected to the VaR regulations and is larger than their utility-
based coefficient during volatile events, αh+φh,r ≥ αh. In volatile events RFIs shift wealth
out of risky assets into the safe haven provided by the riskless asset. This is one way of
capturing the often-heard expression among practitioners that “risk-aversion went up,” or
that there is a “flight to quality.” This is reminiscent of the effect of portfolio insurance on
optimal asset holdings found in Grossman and Zhou (1996). Also see Gennotte and Leland
(1990) and Basak (1995). As a matter of convention, we reserve the term risk-aversion to
the CARA coefficients αh. We call αh + φh,r the coefficient of effective risk-aversion, and
we call its inverse risk appetite. From here it can be easily shown that the FIs with risk
aversions close to ℓ are highly levered in that they borrow from the more risk averse and
invest that borrowed money in risky projects, thereby effectively acting as banks.
Market clearing prices require that the total excess demand by regulated and unregulated
institutions,
∫ ℓ
ℓ
[η(h)yh,r+(1−η(h))yh,u]dh− θ˜a must equal zero. Equivalently they satisfy
the relation:
q =
1
Rf
[
µˆ−ΨΣˆθ˜a
]
(3)
where
Ψ−1 :=
∫ ℓ
ℓ
[
η(h)
1
αh + φh,r
+ (1− η(h)) 1
αh
]
dh (4)
is the aggregate effective risk-tolerance. Prices are equal to risk-neutral prices minus a
risk adjustment. Ψ can also be viewed as the reward-to-variability ratio (or a market-
price of risk scalar) of the market θ˜
a
, Ψ =
µˆM−Rf qM
σˆ2
M
. Compared to an economy without
any VaR constraints where the market-price of risk scalar is γ :=
(∫ ℓ
ℓ
1
αh
dh
)−1
, we have
Ψ ≥ γ. But the market price of risk is not only higher in a constrained economy than
in an unconstrained one, it also is endogenous and random through the additional risk
aversion φh imposed by the regulations.8 The sole pricing factor being the market portfolio
8Equations (2, 3 and 4) remain valid if utility functions are not of the constant absolute risk-aversion
class. The only difference would be that αh = −E
d[uh
′′
]
Ed[uh′]
, and therefore endogenous. While no closed-form
solutions exist in this more general case, Ψ ≥ γ would still hold and the rationale underlying our results
would survive with reasonable income effects. Since most results in the sequel are driven mainly by the
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θ˜
a
, it becomes apparent that assuming noise traders is equivalent to assuming a random
aggregate endowment in risky assets of θ˜
a
.
5 On Market Clearing
Our definition of a rational expectations competitive equilibrium as a pricing function Q
mapping noise trades ǫ to market clearing prices is entirely standard (see Radner (1979)):
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium is a pricing function Q together with its do-
main, Q : E× R+ → RN , an asset allocation (h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ], t ∈ {r, u}, ǫ ∈ E) 7→ (yh,t, yh,t0 )(ǫ)
and a consumption allocation (h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ], t ∈ {r, u}, ǫ ∈ E) 7→ xh,t(ǫ) such that
(i) Given any (ǫ, v¯) ∈ E×R+ and q ∈ Q(ǫ, v¯), (yh,t, yh,t0 , xh,t) solve FI (h, t)’s optimization
problem, and this is true for all FIs (h, t) ∈ [ℓ, ℓ]× {r, u}.
(ii) Markets for risky assets clear,
∫ ℓ
ℓ
[
η(h)yh,r + (1− η(h))yh,u] dh = θ˜a, for each ǫ ∈ E.
(iii) Expectations are confirmed: the pricing function under which investors optimize co-
incides with the equilibrium pricing function.
Proposition 1 solves for the equilibrium Ψ (see Equations (15, 16, 17) in the Appendix for
an exact expression) and prices. Most proofs are contained in the Appendix, and all figures
are at the end of the paper.
Proposition 1 (Existence) If η(h) < 1 over a set of positive Lebesgue measure, there
exists a unique competitive equilibrium for any (ǫ, v¯, ℓ) ∈ E× [0,∞)× (0, ℓ].
If η = 1 almost everywhere, there exists an equilibrium for ℓ ∈ [0, ℓ] and for (v¯, ǫ) satisfying
ǫ ∈ E(v¯, ℓ) := {ǫ ∈ E : [(θa − ǫ)′Σˆ(θa − ǫ)]1/2 ≤ (ℓ − ℓ)√v¯}. For (v¯, ǫ) such that ǫ ∈
int E(v¯, ℓ), the equilibrium is unique, while for (v¯, ǫ) such that ǫ ∈ ∂E(v¯, ℓ) asset prices
and consumption allocations are indeterminate (within a certain range of prices) but the
allocation of risky assets is not. No equilibrium exists for ǫ ∈ E := E \ E(v¯, ℓ).
fact that risk-constraints effectively lower aggregate risk-tolerance, we feel comfortable as to the robustness
of the results derived here. This is strengthened by the fact that for small risks (such as in a continuous-
time framework) the CARA-normal model is essentially true without loss of generality, even if neither
preferences are of the CARA type nor returns are normal. In the event of “normal market conditions”
we can think of random payoffs as being a “small” risk. This strengthens the case for the CARA-normal
model since the events that may lead to non-normal distributions ex-ante are embodied in the systemic
event. We do not assume that payoffs or returns are ex-ante normally distributed, only that payoffs are
conditionally normally distributed.
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Equilibria always exist if there are unregulated financial institutions (η < 1 over a set of
positive Lebesgue measure). If almost all institutions are regulated (η = 1), then there are
combinations of regulatory levels v¯ and asset endowment innovations −ǫ in which markets
cannot clear. This happens precisely if the endowment θ˜
a
that has to be absorbed by the
regulated financial institutions is sufficiently different from 0 so that the number of agents
over which the risk needs to be evenly spread, κ(ǫ; v¯) :=
√
(θa−ǫ)′Σˆ(θa−ǫ)
v¯
, is larger than the
population: κ > ℓ− ℓ. This defines the non-existence event E. This feature is not a short-
coming of our model. In fact, any model would exhibit such a result as it relies solely on the
universality of VaR constraints. Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon in an economy with
two assets and different levels of tightness v¯. Each level of tightness determines an ellipsoid
set of noise supplies that can be supported by a competitive equilibrium. For ǫ outside
of this ellipsoid, FIs cannot absorb the supply as described earlier, and markets break
down. And for a tighter regulatory level v¯2 < v¯1, the set of supportable supplies shrinks
even further, E(v¯2) ⊂ E(v¯1). This suggests the policy implication that if the supervisory
authorities impose stringent risk limits (in the sense that v¯ is small enough to lead to
E(v¯) 6∋ 0, i.e. v¯ < θa′Σˆθa
(ℓ−ℓ)2
), some agents need to be exempted from those constraints for
markets to clear. For derivatives, however, 0 ∈ E, and no exemptions are required as long
as regulations are not too strict.
6 Equilibrium Pricing Function
The imposition of the VaR constraints affects the equilibria directly, with interesting results
on risk-taking, liquidity, and volatility. We present our main results about the equilibrium
pricing function during normal market conditions in a series of Propositions, with all proofs
relegated to the Appendix. We shall retain the following assumption in this section. Basi-
cally it requires that the set of possible stochastic asset supplies is such that for sufficiently
strict regulations, some agents face binding VaR constraints. Evidently, the problem is not
interesting otherwise.
Assumption [A]. For a given E assume that there is a v¯′ such that there is a compact
subset of E, call it E′, which is non-null, Pǫ(E′) > 0, and which is such that ∀ǫ ∈ E′,
κ(ǫ) > ℓ(ln ℓ − ln ℓ) for all v¯ ≤ v¯′. Also, assume that the covariance matrix of the
stochastic asset supplies over E′, E[(ǫ−E[ǫ])(ǫ−E[ǫ])⊤1ǫ∈E′ ], exists and is positive
definite.
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6.1 Prices and Risk Premia
From (3) and (4) we know that the equilibrium pricing function is
Q(ǫ, v¯) =
1
Rf
[
µˆ−Ψ(κ(ǫ, v¯))Σˆ(θa − ǫ)
]
(5)
with κ(ǫ, v¯) :=
√
(θa−ǫ)′Σˆ(θa−ǫ)
v¯
. Since in economies where regulations are binding the
reward-to-variability ratio is higher than in unregulated economies, Ψ > γ, it follows from
(5) that at equilibrium, a binding risk-regulation induces lower prices for a risky asset j
compared to the unconstrained economy iff the covariance of asset j’s payoff with the payoff
of the market portfolio θ˜
a
, equivalently the beta, is positive, (Σˆ)jthrowθ˜
a
> 0, and higher
prices otherwise. Therefore equity risk premia are higher the more tightly regulated the
economy is:
Proposition 2 (Equity Risk Premia) Let v¯2 < v¯1. Then µi(ǫ, v¯2)−Rf > µi(ǫ, v¯1)−Rf .
Here µi(ǫ, v¯) := µˆi/Qi(ǫ, v¯) is the conditional expected return on asset i. It is indeed easy
to see that the CAPM with respect to the market portfolio holds. For instance, the excess
return on asset i is µi − Rf = βM,i(µM − Rf ), where µM − Rf = Ψσˆ
2
M
qM
. The tighter the
economy is regulated, the higher Ψ and the lower qM , generating higher expected excess
returns.9
Intuitively, a more tightly regulated economy transfers risk from the less risk-averse to
the more risk-averse investors for markets to clear. But the latter need to be induced
to buy into the risk by more advantageous prices, i.e. by higher expected returns. If
the stylized coefficients of risk-aversion are too low to match asset returns when using
frictionless models, the additional degree of effective risk-aversion Ψ− γ due to risk-taking
constraints, such as the ones imposed by the regulatory environment, may form the basis
of a model that attempts to address the equity premium puzzle (as outlined by Mehra and
Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1989). This is left as an avenue for future exploration.
6.2 Depth
The risk constraint affects the depth of the markets directly. In our context, depth is an
appropriate measure of liquidity. The inverse of the depth of the entire market, shallowness
s(ǫ, v¯), is defined as the maximal extent to which an additional (unit-size) market order
9σˆ2M is the variance of the payoff of the residual market portfolio, and therefore exogenous. The price
of the market portfolio, qM := q
′θ˜
a
is given by R−1f µˆ
′
θ˜
a − R−1f Ψ(θ˜
a
)′Σˆθ˜
a
, decreasing unambiguously in
Ψ.
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for a portfolio impacts its price. Formally,
s(ǫ, v¯) := max
θ subject to ‖θ‖=1
|θ′dQ| = max
θ subject to ‖θ‖=1
|θ′(∂ǫQ)θ|
With this definition in mind, we can state:
Proposition 3 (Depth) Depth is lower the tighter the constraint (i.e. the smaller v¯),
∂s(ǫ,v¯)
∂v¯
< 0 for all ǫ ∈ E. In particular, depth is lower in the regulated economy than in the
unregulated economy for any ǫ ∈ E.
Refer to Figure 4 for an illustration. No RFI’s risk taking constraint is binding for ǫ ∈
[θa(v¯), θ¯a(v¯)]. We have not made any assumptions regarding the distribution of ǫ. However,
in most cases we expect the market portfolio to be positive θ˜
a
> 0. If we assume thatN = 1,
then the pricing function is concave over the relevant domain {ǫ : θ˜a > 0}, and in most
interesting cases –large positive shocks to the asset endowment that need to be absorbed,
or restrictive regulations– the pricing function is strictly concave. The same can be shown
for N > 1 given the proper restrictions on the domain of noise trades. If we assume that
regulations are sufficiently strict so that some agents are hitting the regulatory constraint
at ǫ = 0, v¯ <
(
σθa
ℓ(ln ℓ−ln ℓ)
)2
, and also that Pǫ([θa,∞)) = 0, then an inflow raises prices less
than the corresponding outflow lowers them. This is the widespread phenomenon dubbed
by traders as “going up by the stairs and coming down by the elevator.”
6.3 Volatility, Diversification and Comovements
In the single asset case, inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the time zero asset price becomes
more volatile the stricter the VaR constraints are. In other words, uniform shallowness
implies ex-ante volatility. The single-asset intuition can then be extended to the general
case (a matrix M1 is more positive definite than a matrix M2 if M1 = M2 + N , with N
positive definite):
Proposition 4 (Volatility) Consider any two levels of regulation v¯ < v¯′, at least one
of them binding for some RFIs. The variance-covariance matrix of asset prices in the
v¯ economy is more positive definite than the one in the v¯′ economy. It follows that the
equilibrium price of any portfolio (and therefore of any security) becomes more volatile in
the economy with tighter regulations, v¯, than in economy v¯′. In particular, there is more
volatility in the constrained economy than in the unconstrained economy.
The basic intuition behind these results is as follows. The endowment shocks which were
absorbed by the more risk neutral RFIs in economy v¯′ now have to be absorbed in the
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economy with v¯ < v¯′ by the more risk averse. However, the more risk averse are less willing
to absorb these (additional) units than the less risk averse. Hence the imposition of the risk
constraint reduces market depth, and the market impact of a market order is larger. Since
the arrival of market orders (asset endowments) is random, this generates more volatile
asset prices.10
The fact that both individual assets and portfolios become necessarily more volatile suggests
at the very least that diversification does not improve sufficiently to counteract the increases
in the volatilities of the assets, since any portfolio, no matter how it is diversified, becomes
more volatile. In fact, by the multi-asset nature of our model, we can naturally show that
covariances between individual assets increase with stricter regulation:
Proposition 5 (Comovements) Assets that are intrinsically statistically independent
(i.e. the payoffs as well as the endowment shocks of the assets considered are statistically
mutually independent) become positively correlated due to risk-regulations.
Even if two asset classes are payoff-independent and hit by independent endowment or
noise trader shocks, if the regulations are strict enough to bind over a set of positive
measure, then a large liquidity shock hitting one asset class will induce the VaR regulation
to bind for some RFIs. These RFIs will subsequently need to adjust their global risk
position, thereby creating comovements in asset prices among classes that would seem
to be unrelated. Furthermore, these comovements would be detectable mostly in crisis
situations since the VaR constraints do not bind in subdued periods. It would therefore
seem that the VaR constraints bear one further seed of instability by not only creating
asset price volatility, but by inducing correlations during the exact periods where such
correlations are most dangerous. This phenomenon is often referred to as “contagion” in
the finance literature, e.g. in Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
Our result provides a complementary contagion channel to the income effects channel,
and clarifies why these comovements occur especially during crisis and what the impact of
risk-regulations on contagion could be.
10In a certain sense the additional volatility is generated from the fact that some agents, while active in
the market, are restricted from participating fully. In Allen and Gale (1994) it is shown that (endogenous)
restricted participation (in the sense of either choosing to bear some fixed costs and fully participate, or not
participate at all) also may lead to more volatile asset prices. In their two-asset setup the result is driven
by the assumption that neither the riskless nor the long term risky asset can be shorted. This implies that
if in equilibrium only the aggressive agents participate, then they will not hold much of a cash buffer to
absorb liquidity trades. As a result prices are more volatile than in a full participation equilibrium where
cash-rich backward investors also participate.
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7 How Successful is the VaR Constraint?
To make the regulatory problem interesting and transparent, we make the following as-
sumption in this section:
Assumption [B]. [B1]: (θh,t0 , θ
h,t) = 1
ℓ−ℓ
(θa0 , θ
a), all (h, t). [B2]: P({ǫ ∈ E : (K+q)′θ˜a ≤
0}) = 0. [B3]: (E,K, v¯) are so that 0 < P(F) < 1.
Assumption [B1] insures a neutral distribution of endowments that is not biased in favour
or against the success of the VaR regulations. Assumption [B2] prevents pathological
cases whereby the value of the entire market is negative, and [B3] assumes that refinancing
conditions are not so strict (so weak) as to lead to failure almost surely (almost never).
Proposition 6 implies that if [B] holds, the VaR regulations are effective in reducing the
probability of a systemic crash.11
Proposition 6 Assume that [B1] and [B2] hold.
Lowering v¯ reduces the probability of a systemic event P(L ∩ F) (but at the expense of a
lower probability of market clearing P(E) if η = 1 almost everywhere), strictly so under
[B3]. Furthermore, if η = 1 almost everywhere and P(θa0 ≥ K′θ˜
a
) = 1, then P(L ∩ F) = 0
for small enough v¯.
The reason why this policy is effective is as follows. The less risk-averse FIs hold large
amounts of the risky portfolio if regulation is weak, and therefore will have to borrow at
the riskless rate to finance such a risky holding, unless they are endowed with large amounts
of assets to start with, which we exclude by condition [B]. Stricter risk-limits curb both the
amount of risky assets held by the less risk-averse RFIs as well as their required leverage, and
therefore make it more likely that such institutions are able to take part in the refinancing
of the firms. The more subtle point is, however, that stricter VaR limits reduce prices
and thereby induce UFIs, and in particular the less risk-averse ones, to purchase the risky
assets sold by the RFIs. This effect may indicate that systemic risk can increase with a
tightening of regulations. But the non-trivial general equilibrium effect on prices and the
differential elasticities if demand for risk-averse versus less risk-averse investors means that
buyers (the UFIs and the more risk averse RFIs) can purchase their larger holdings in risky
assets at lower prices. The net effect is that the less risk-averse leave in equilibrium more
of their wealth invested in the riskless asset (sold to them by the more risk-averse agents),
creating less of a systemic imbalance despite holding riskier portfolios. This benefit must
be balanced by the loss of diversification and risk-sharing, by more shallow markets and
the increased volatility of prices during normal market conditions. And if η = 1 almost
11If η = 1 almost everywhere and if ǫ is so that there is no market clearing price vector, then we assume
that markets shut and allocations coincide with endowments. In particular, E ⊂ Fc.
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everywhere, the regulator faces a further cost in that markets may not clear. For very strict
levels of v¯ and very inclusive regulations, and provided the economy in aggregate does have
enough of the riskless asset, then the probability of a systemic crash goes to zero, but the
likelihood of market clearing is reduced as well.
The effectiveness also depends on the distribution and relative mass of RFIs as encapsulated
in η(h). For instance, ceteris paribus, in an economy where η does not depend on h the
regulations are more effective than in an economy where η(h) = 0 for h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ+ (ℓ− ℓ)/2]
and η(h) = 1 otherwise, for there the regulated institutions are not the ones imposing the
externalities while the more risk-tolerant FIs that impose the majority of externalities are
all unregulated.
We would like to conclude with a simple welfare analysis. While VaR based regulation is
effective in the sense of lowering the probability of a systemic event, in light of the afore-
mentioned welfare costs of regulation during normal market times it does not automatically
follow though that risk sensitive regulation is socially beneficial. Whereas a general wel-
fare study would take us too far afield, the following general observations illustrate the
intuition that some regulation might be welfare enhancing while too strict a regulation
would be detrimental. In a nutshell, provided subsistence consumption x is low enough,
a strengthening of regulations will lower the probability of a systemic event and thereby
increase expected utility. This is true up to a point beyond which further regulations are
detrimental to welfare. The following argument formally proves this point.
Expected utility of FI h is given by the integral of uh(xh) over the product measure PL×ǫ×d.
Given a realisation of the liquidity and the endowment shocks (L, ǫ), write the expected
utility over asset return realisations as Ed[uh(xh)](ǫ,L) := w(ǫ,L; v¯). We then have the
ex-ante utility
E[uh(xh)] = PL(L)
∫
ǫ∈F
w(ǫ,L)dPǫ(ǫ) + PL(L)
∫
ǫ∈Fc
w(ǫ,Lc)dPǫ(ǫ)
+ (1− PL(L)
∫
ǫ∈E
w(ǫ,Lc)dPǫ(ǫ)
= PL(L)Pǫ(F)uh(x) +
∫
ǫ∈E
w(ǫ,Lc)dPǫ(ǫ)− PL(L)
∫
ǫ∈F
w(ǫ,Lc)dPǫ(ǫ) (6)
= PL(L)Pǫ(F)
[
uh(x)−Eǫ[w(ǫ,Lc)‖ǫ ∈ F]
]
+ Eǫ[w(ǫ,Lc)] (7)
Equation (7) illustrates the tradeoffs. As regulations become stricter, utility during normal
market times decreases due to the various reasons mentioned before, which has to be
balanced against the reduced probability of a systemic crisis. By Proposition 6, ex-ante
utilility is increasing with a lower v¯ if uh(x) is low enough, at least up to the point where
P(F) = 0. From that point onwards, ex-ante utility is decreasing with a lower v¯. This can
also be gleaned directly by differentiating the expression above to get that welfare increases
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with a smaller v¯ iff
(1− PL(L))
∫
E
∂wh(ǫ,Lc; v¯)
∂v¯
dPǫ(ǫ) + PL(L)
∫
F(v¯)c
∂wh(ǫ,Lc; v¯)
∂v¯
dPǫ(ǫ)
< PL(L)
∫
∂v¯F(v¯)
[wh(ǫ,Lc; v¯)− uh(x)]dPǫ(ǫ)
The LHS represents the incremental welfare costs due to stricter regulation (the costs
expected to be borne during normal market times) while the RHS represents the welfare
gains due to the resulting lower probability of a systemic crash. By Proposition 6 we know
that F becomes smaller if v¯ becomes smaller, and as long as that area ∂v¯F(v¯) is in the
support of Pǫ, which we assume, a low enough x guarantees that stricter regulations lead
to a Pareto dominating allocation. When regulation is strict enough so that P(F) is small
enough, say zero, then the LHS is
∫
E
∂wh(ǫ,Lc;v¯)
∂v¯
dPǫ(ǫ) > 0 and the RHS is zero: the marginal
costs outstrip the marginal gains. This suggests that the optimal level of regulation should
be set at the interior point where the (possibly weighted) integral of the LHS over all h
(the marginal social welfare cost) equals the (possibly weighted) integral of the RHS (the
marginal social welfare gain).
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we are interested in modelling the underlying causes
which generate systemic risk and lead to a rationale for regulating risk. This is in contrast
with most models which impose risk regulation upon a first-best economy and where the
conclusions may not be meaningful or realistic. We then study why and to what extent the
current risk-regulation alleviates systemic risk. We show that risk-sensitive regulations of
the VaR type do reduce the probability of a systemic event and therefore do alleviate some
of the free-riding externalities. Such benefits do have to be balanced by the social costs
imposed by the regulations. Pricing risk is shown to be endogenous. We demonstrate that
the fact of regulating risk-taking changes the statistical properties of financial risk. Markets
may not clear if regulations are too all-encompassing. We also derive equity premia which
are larger than in standard models, going some way towards a resolution of the equity
premium puzzle. We show that illiquidity, volatility and covariations are all larger than in
an unregulated world. In particular they are especially large in periods of distress. This
is so because in periods of distress, such as during panic sales, the market price of risk
parameter Ψ, which also acts as the effective risk aversion parameter, is large. Markets
act as if aggregate risk aversion went up, with less depth and more local volatility as a
result, as illustrated on Figure 4. It is well-known that risk-modelling often fails in periods
of stress due to the breakdown of established historical comovements. Our model exhibits
some of the nonlinearities at the heart of this phenomenon and exhibits conditions under
which there is an optimal interior amount of risk-sensitive regulation.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 The program consists in solving (the superscript d indicates that the
expectation is computed with respect to the probability of the payoffs d)
max
{yh,yh
0
}
Ed
[
uh(d0[θ
h
0 + q
′θ˜
h − q′yh] + d′yh)|ǫ
]
− λh
[
yh
′
Σˆyh − v¯
]
The FOCs (the program is strictly convex and constraint qualification holds), so the FOCs
are both necessary and sufficient) are Ed
[
uh
′
(W h)(d− d0q)|ǫ
]
= 2λhΣˆyh, or equivalently
Covd(uh
′
(W h),d|ǫ) + Ed
[
uh
′
(W h)|ǫ
]
E[d]− d0Ed
[
uh
′
(W h)|ǫ
]
q = 2λhΣˆyh
Next, by Stein’s Lemma [recall that Stein’s Lemma asserts that if x and y are multivari-
ate normal, if g is everywhere differentiable and if E[g′(y)] < ∞, then Cov(x, g(y)) =
E[g′(y)]Cov(x, y)] and the fact that Covd(d,W h|ǫ) = Covd(d,d′yh|ǫ) = Σˆyh we get that:
yh =
1
αh + φh
Σˆ
−1
[µˆ− d0q]
where we also used the fact that in this CARA–Normal setup −E
d[uh
′′
|ǫ]
Ed[uh′|ǫ]
= αh, and where
we defined φh := 2λ
h
Ed[uh′|ǫ]
.
Finally, we’ll derive the expression for αh + φh and show that it does not depend on the
wealth of the institution. In order to accomplish this, we first need to find an expression
for φh. To simplify expressions, define
ρ := (µˆ−Rfq)′ Σˆ−1 (µˆ− Rfq) (8)
It can easily be established that
yh
′
Σˆyh = v¯ (and λh ≥ 0)⇒ αh + φh =
√
ρ
v¯
(9)
yh
′
Σˆyh < v¯ (so λh = 0)⇒ αh + φh = αh (10)
Indeed, assume that yh
′
Σˆyh = v¯. Since yh = 1
αh+φh
Σˆ(µˆ − Rfq), this expression becomes(
1
αh+φh
)2
ρ = v¯. Of course, if yh
′
Σˆyh < v¯ then λh = 0 and thus φh = 0.
This implies that αh + φh is independent of W h0 for given prices,
αh + φh = max
{
αh,
√
ρ
v¯
}
(11)
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Indeed, assume first that yh
′
Σˆyh < v¯. Then by (10) we have that αh + φh = αh, so we
need to show that αh ≥ √ρ
v¯
. Now since yh
′
Σˆyh = αh
−2
ρ, we know that αh
−2
ρ < v¯, so
that indeed αh >
√
ρ
v¯
. Next, assume that yh
′
Σˆyh = v¯. Then from (9) αh + φh =
√
ρ
v¯
. So
we need to establish that αh ≤√ρ
v¯
, which follows from φh ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1 Before we proceed to the proof, notice that by Walras’ Law,
the markets for the riskless asset and for consumption clear if the market for risky assets
clears. Indeed, denote aggregated FIs quantities by a superscript a: for any quantity x,∫ ℓ
ℓ
(η(h)xh,r + (1− η(h))xh,u)dh = xa. Walras’ Law at times 0 and 2 says that (ya0 − θa0) +
q′(ya − θa + ǫ) = 0 [W0] and xa = d0ya0 + d′ya [W2]. So assume that ya − θa + ǫ = 0.
Then by [W0] the market for the riskless asset clears as well, and by [W2] we immediately
have clearing of the commodities market, xa = d0θ
a
0 + d
′(θa − ǫ), under “normal market
conditions.”
We now exhibit a solution to the fixed-point problem of existence. Fix some ǫ ∈ E and
assume first that ℓ > 0. Recall from (4) that
Ψ−1 =
∫ ℓ
ℓ
η(h)
1
αh + φh,r
dh+
∫ ℓ
ℓ
(1− η(h)) 1
αh
dh
=
∫
I1
η(h)
1
αh
dh+
∫
I2
η(h)
√
v¯
ρ
dh+
∫ ℓ
ℓ
(1− η(h)) 1
αh
dh (12)
where I1 :=
{
h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ] : αh >√ρ
v¯
}
and I2 :=
{
h ∈ [ℓ, ℓ] : αh ≤√ρ
v¯
}
.
In order to solve for the equilibrium, we use (3) to express q as a function of Ψ and then
solve (12) for Ψ.
For convenience, we establish some preliminary calculations and notation. First, insert
the pricing relation (3) into the definition of ρ from (8) to get the expression
√
ρ =
Ψ
√
(θa − ǫ)′Σˆ(θa − ǫ). Second, define the relation
κ(ǫ) :=
√
(θa − ǫ)′Σˆ(θa − ǫ)
v¯
≡ Ψ−1
√
ρ
v¯
(13)
κ(ǫ) represents the ratio of the standard deviation of the dividends of the residual market
portfolio θa − ǫ to the maximal allowable standard deviation of the payoffs of individ-
ual portfolios. Now we also use the assumption that αh = h. There are three cases to
distinguish:
Assume first that κΨ ≤ ℓ. Then we get Ψ = 1
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
.
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Next, assume that κΨ ∈ (ℓ, ℓ). Then
Ψ−1 = (ln ℓ− ln ℓ)−
∫ Ψκ
ℓ
[h−1 − (Ψκ)−1]η(h)dh (14)
Finally, assume that κΨ ≥ ℓ, in which case Ψ = 1−κ
−1
R ℓ
ℓ
η(h)dh
R ℓ
ℓ
(1−η(h)) 1
h
dh
.
This system is equivalent to the following, where we define κ := ℓ(ln ℓ − ln ℓ) and κ :=
ℓ
∫ ℓ
ℓ
(1− η(h))h−1dh+ ∫ ℓ
ℓ
η(h)dh:
Ψ =
1
ln ℓ− ln ℓ if κ ≤ κ (15)
Ψ−1 = ln ℓ− ln ℓ−
∫ κΨ
ℓ
[h−1 − (κΨ)−1]η(h)dh if κ ∈ (κ, κ) (16)
Ψ =
1− κ−1 ∫ ℓ
ℓ
η(h)dh∫ ℓ
ℓ
(1− η(h)) 1
h
dh
if κ ≥ κ (17)
That the systems are equivalent can be verified as follows. First assume κ ≤ κ and
Ψ = 1
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
. Then Ψκ ≤ ℓ, which warrants the choice of Ψ. Now assume κ ∈ (κ, κ).
Premultiply (16) by κ−1 and use the assumption that κ > ℓ to get κΨ > ℓ. Now assume to
the contrary that κΨ ≥ ℓ. Using the fact that η(h) = 0 if h > ℓ, (16) can be rearranged by
grouping the κΨ terms to say (κΨ)−1 =
ln ℓ−ln ℓ−
R ℓ
ℓ
h−1η(h)dh
κ−
R ℓ
ℓ
η(h)dh
≤ ℓ−1 by assumption. Rewriting
we get κ ≥ κ, a contradiction. So κΨ < ℓ. Finally, assume κ ≥ κ. Using (17) we get that
κΨ ≥ ℓ, which in turn justifies our choice of Ψ.
Recall that ǫ affects Ψ only in as far as it affects κ, Ψ(κ). For each κ, there is a unique Ψ
solving this system. For the regions κ ≤ κ and κ ≥ κ this is obvious. So assume κ ∈ (κ, κ).
Using x for κΨ, we rewrite (16) as x = RHS(x) :=
κ+
R x
ℓ
[xh−1−1]η(h)dh
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
. It is easy to see
that the mapping RHS(x) is weakly increasing and convex, with slope strictly less than
1. Since RHS(ℓ) = limxցℓRHS(x) =
κ
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
. Assume that κ
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
≤ ℓ, then κ ≤ κ, a
contradiction, so RHS(ℓ) > ℓ. Similarly, RHS(ℓ) < ℓ from the assumption κ < κ. It
follows that there is one and only one fixed point x ∈ (ℓ, ℓ).
Notice that if η = 1 almost everywhere, then
Ψ(κ) =


1
ln ℓ−ln ℓ
; κ ∈ [0, ℓ(ln ℓ− ln ℓ)]
− κ+ℓ
κW−1(−(κ+ℓ) exp(−1−ln ℓ))
; κ ∈ (ℓ(ln ℓ− ln ℓ), ℓ− ℓ)
any number ≥ ℓ
ℓ−ℓ
; κ = ℓ− ℓ
undefined ; κ > ℓ− ℓ
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whereW−1(·) is the non-principal (lower) branch of the LambertW -correspondence. Recall
that the Lambert W -correspondence is defined as the multivariate inverse of the function
w 7→ wew. In particular, the solution to ax+ b ln x + c = 0 is given by x = b
a
W−1
(
a
b
e−
c
b
)
.
Notice that the mapping Ψ is C1 (but not C2 since the second derivative to the left of
ℓ(ln ℓ − ln ℓ) is zero while the second derivative to the right is η
ℓ2(ln(ℓ)−ln(ℓ))4
> 0) and that
by construction the equilibrium Ψ satisfies Ψ ≥ γ.
Over the entire domain the function Ψ(κ) is illustrated in figure (3). In the case for η = 1
and κ = 1 − ℓ, which is equivalent to ǫ being on the boundary of E, the equilibrium can
be shown to exhibit real indeterminacy.
Proof of Proposition 3 As preliminaries, let us record the following useful results:
J1 ∂κ
∂v¯
= −1
2
κ
v¯
, from the definition of κ, and ∂ǫκ = κ
−1v¯−1Σˆ(ǫ− θa).
J2 ∂2ǫ,v¯Ψ = − 12v¯
[
κ∂
2Ψ
∂κ2
+ ∂Ψ
∂κ
]
∂ǫκ. Indeed, since
dΨ
dv¯
= ∂Ψ
∂κ
∂κ
∂v¯
, we know from J1 that ∂2ǫ,v¯Ψ =
d
dǫ
(
∂Ψ
∂κ
∂κ
∂v¯
)
=∂κ
∂v¯
∂2Ψ
∂κ2
∂ǫκ+
∂Ψ
∂κ
∂ǫ
(−1
2
κ
v¯
)
.
J3 ∂ǫQ is positive definite (downward-sloping equilibrium inverse demand). Indeed, ∂ǫQ =
R−1f
[
ΨΣˆ− Σˆ(θa − ǫ)(∂ǫΨ)′
]
=R−1f
[
ΨΣˆ+ Σˆ(θa − ǫ) (θa − ǫ)′Σˆκ−1v¯−1 ∂Ψ
∂κ
]
, positive
definite.
J4 For κ ∈ (κ, κ), ∂Ψ
∂κ
=
κ−2
R κΨ
ℓ
η(h)dh
ln ℓ−ln ℓ−
R κΨ
ℓ
h−1η(h)dh
> 0. Indeed, totally differentiate (16) and use
(16) to sign.
The idea of the proof is to show that ∂2ǫ,v¯Q is negative definite. Intuitively, we want to
show that the market impact of a trade goes up as the regulation is tightened, i.e. that
∂
∂v¯
|(dq)′(dǫ)| = ∂
∂v¯
[(dq)′(dǫ)] < 0 since (dq)′(dǫ) > 0 as ∂ǫQ is positive definite by J3. Now
this expression equals ∂
∂v¯
[(dǫ)′∂ǫQ(dǫ)] = (dǫ)
′∂2ǫ,v¯Q(dǫ) < 0 for all dǫ 6= 0, but that’s the
definition of negative definiteness.
Before we show that ∂2ǫ,v¯Q(dǫ) is negative definite, we want to relate this idea to the
definition of shallowness, s(ǫ, v¯) := maxθ |θ′(∂ǫQ)θ| such that ‖θ‖ = 1, namely that ∂s∂v¯ < 0
iff ∂2ǫ,v¯Q negative definite. Indeed, pick any θ such that ‖θ‖ = 1, then it is immediate that
∂(θ′∂ǫQθ)
∂v¯
= θ′ (−∂ǫ,v¯Q) θ, which proves the claim. A tighter v¯ makes ∂ǫQ more positive
definite.
The pricing function is Q(ǫ, v¯) = R−1f
[
µˆ−ΨΣˆ(θa − ǫ)
]
, from which we can deduce that
∂v¯Q = −R−1f Σˆ(θa − ǫ)dΨdv¯ , and furthermore that ∂2ǫ,v¯Q = R−1f ΣˆdΨdv¯ − R−1f Σˆ(θa − ǫ)∂2ǫ,v¯Ψ.
This expression can be simplified, using J2, to
∂2ǫ,v¯Q = −
1
2
R−1f
∂Ψ
∂κ
κ
v¯
Σˆ− 1
2
R−1f v¯
−2
[
∂2Ψ
∂κ2
κ +
∂Ψ
∂κ
] [
Σˆ(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)′Σˆ
]
κ−1
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The first term is negative definite by J4, while the second one is negative semidefinite.
Indeed, it can be shown that the expression
[
∂2Ψ
∂κ2
κ + ∂Ψ
∂κ
]
is strictly positive, while the term[
Σˆ(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)′Σˆ
]
is clearly positive semidefinite. This concludes the proof that ∂2ǫ,v¯Q
is negative definite.
Proof of Proposition 4 The variance-covariance matrix of prices is given by
Ω := E[(Q− E[Q])(Q−E[Q])⊤]
=
1
R2f
ΣˆE[Ψ2(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤]Σˆ− 1
R2f
ΣˆE[Ψ(θa − ǫ)]E[Ψ(θa − ǫ)⊤]Σˆ
Differentiation this matrix with respect to v¯ we get
∂v¯Ω =
1
R2f
ΣˆE
[
2Ψ
∂Ψ
∂v¯
(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤
]
Σˆ−
1
R2f
Σˆ
[
E[Ψ(θa − ǫ)]E
[
∂Ψ
∂v¯
(θa − ǫ)
]⊤
+ E
[
∂Ψ
∂v¯
(θa − ǫ)
]
E[Ψ(θa − ǫ)]⊤
]
Σˆ
In view of the nonpositive sign of ∂Ψ
∂v¯
, both matrices are NSD. We show next that the first
matrix is, in interesting economies at least where the VaR constraint does bind, in fact
ND. Write w := −Ψ∂Ψ
∂v¯
, a positive random variable. By assumption [A], there is a strictly
positive w := infǫ∈E′ w and furthermore
E[(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤1ǫ∈E′ ] is PD
It follows that
detwE[(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤1ǫ∈E′ ] > 0
⇒ detE[w(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤1ǫ∈E′ ] > 0
⇒ detE[w(θa − ǫ)(θa − ǫ)⊤] > 0
This shows that ∂v¯Ω is ND. It follows that stricter regulations (lower v¯) make the variance-
covariance matrix of prices more positive definite, and in particular each variance increases.
Since the variance of a portfolio θ ∈ RN is θ⊤Ωθ, the variance of any portfolio increases
as (binding) regulations become stricter.
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider any two assets, say assets 1 and 2. Intrinsic inde-
pendence requires Σˆ diagonal, ǫ1 and ǫ2 stochastically independent, and the absence of
regulations so that Ψ = ϕ. Then Q1(ǫ1) and Q2(ǫ2), so Q1 and Q2 are stochastically
independent.
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Since Qi =
[
µˆi −Ψ(ǫ)Σˆi(θa − ǫ)
]
/Rf ,
Cov(Q1, Q2) = Σˆ11Σˆ22Cov(Ψθ˜1,Ψθ˜2)
1
R2f
≥ 0
with Ψ(θ˜1, θ˜2). The last inequality follows from the fact that independent rvs are associated,
see Esary et al. (1967). Indeed, with θ˜1 stochastically independent of θ˜2, any increasing
functions (φ1, φ2) satisfy Cov(φ1(θ˜1, θ˜2), φ2(θ˜1, θ˜2)) ≥ 0, i.e. (θ˜1, θ˜2) are associated. Since
the VaR constraint is binding over a subset of states for some level of regulation, a strict
inequality follows.
Proof of Proposition 6 Define by v∗(ǫ) the weakest level of regulation for which all
RFIs hit their VaR constraints and by v∗(ǫ) the weakest level of regulation for which there
is at least some RFI with a binding VaR constraint.12 In order to ascertain the probability
of failure in refinancing we need to study the mapping (we have used the fact that in
equilibrium yh,t = Ψ
h+φh,t
θ˜
a
)
h 7→ Sh,t := Ψ
h+ φh,t
(K + q)′θ˜
a − 1
ℓ− ℓ
[
q′θ˜
a
+ θa0
]
and Sh := η(h)Sh,r + (1− η(h))Sh,u.
F1
∫ ℓ
ℓ
Shdh = K ′θ˜
a − θa0 , irrespective of v¯ (this follows from (16)).
F2 Sh is continuous in h.
Assume [B] holds and that for a given ǫ, v¯ ∈ (v∗(ǫ), v∗(ǫ)), then Ψκ ∈ (ℓ, ℓ) and Sh satisfies:
F3 Sh,r = Sh
′,r, all h, h′ ≤ Ψκ. For such h and h′ with a binding constraint, Ψ
h+φh
= κ−1
(this is shown in the proof of Proposition 1), so Sh does not depend on h.
F4 Sh,r < Sh
′,r for h > h′, h > Ψκ, and Sh,u < Sh
′,u for h > h′. Pick for instance h > Ψκ
and h′ < Ψκ. Then Sh,r − Sh′,r = (Ψ
h
− κ−1) [(K + q)′θ˜a] < 0 by [B2] and by the
fact that Ψ
h
− κ−1 < 0 due to the assumption h > Ψκ.
F5 Consider either an arbitrary (h, u), or an (h, r) with h > κΨ. Then some algebra reveals
that ∂S
h,t
∂v¯
< 0 iff h > h˜(v¯) := Ψ(ℓ − ℓ) − (ℓ−ℓ)Rf (K+q)′θ˜
a
θ˜
a′
Σθ˜
a
. For (h, r) with h < Ψκ,
∂Sh,r
∂v¯
> 0 always holds true.
12Set both terms equal to zero if η ≡ 0.
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For a given v¯, recall that the event Fv¯ is defined as{
ǫ ∈ E : S(v¯) :=
∫ ℓ
ℓ
[
η(h)max{0, Sh,r(ǫ, v¯)}+ (1− η(h))max{0, Sh,u(ǫ, v¯)}] dh > S¯
}
Recall that for an ǫ ∈ E (which can occur only if η = 1) the autarky allocation results, and
by [B1] the autarky allocation can never lead to a critical imbalance, so we set Sh(ǫ, v¯) ≡ 0
for ǫ ∈ E. We now show that Fv¯ ⊂ Fv¯′ if v¯ < v¯′. So pick ǫ ∈ Fv¯. Then S(v¯) > S¯.
If ǫ is so that Sh as a function of h is either uniformly nonnegative or uniformly nonpositive,
then by F1 S(v¯) = S(v¯′). It follows that ǫ ∈ Fv¯′ .
Otherwise if Sh is neither nonnegative nor nonpositive for all h (and there must be a non-
null set of such ǫ by [B3]), then we have two cases. Consider first the case h˜ > Ψκ. If
Sh˜(v¯) = Sh˜(v¯′) > 0, then by F4 (the absolute value of) the integral of the negative part
of Sh(v¯′) is larger than the one of Sh(v¯). Since by F1 the overall areas must coincide, the
integral of the positive part of Sh(v¯′) is larger than the one of Sh(v¯), i.e. S(v¯′) > S(v¯). If
on the other hand Sh˜(v¯) = Sh˜(v¯′) < 0, then we can focus on the positive parts of the two
functions directly, since in that case Sh(v¯′) > Sh(v¯) for h s.t. Sh(v¯) > 0, from which again
we can deduce that S(v¯′) > S(v¯).
Consider now the case h˜ < Ψκ. By the assumption that h˜ < Ψκ, Sh(v¯′) < Sh(v¯) for all
h > Ψκ (by F5). The area of the negative part of Sh(v¯′) is larger than the one of Sh(v¯), so
(again by F1) must be the positive areas, i.e. S(v¯′) > S(v¯).
It follows that ǫ ∈ Fv¯′ and that Fv¯ ⊂ Fv¯′ .
Now we show that if η = 1 and P(θa0 ≥ K′θ˜
a
) = 1, then P(L ∩ F) = 0 for small enough
v¯. As long as E 6= {θa}, there is a nonempty set U := {(v¯, ǫ) ∈ R+ × E : v¯ = v∗(ǫ)}. By
definition, in each constellation in U all FIs face binding constraints, and κ = ℓ − ℓ and
Ψ = ℓ
ℓ−ℓ
. We see that Sh = 1
ℓ−ℓ
[K ′θ˜
a−θa0 ] ≤ 0, irrespective of h, and S = 0 < S¯. Therefore
the result follows for all v¯ ≤ infǫ∈E v∗(ǫ).
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ǫ2
ǫ1
E(v¯1)E(v¯2)θ
a
Figure 2: Equilibrium ellipsoids with increasingly restrictive risk con-
straints for η = 1
In this scenario there are two assets, and in the absence of any regulations, equilibria
exist for ǫ ∈ R2. When the risk constraint is v¯1, the set of ǫ that can be supported by
an equilibrium is the larger ellipsoid, and includes zero noise trader demand. However
a more restrictive constraint v¯2 does not include zero net demand, and hence equilibria
do not exist if noise trades are zero.
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ℓ(ln ℓ− ln ℓ)
Figure 3: Illustration of the reward-to-risk function Ψ(κ) when η = 1 and
ℓ > 0.
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No Constraint
Q(·,∞)
Weak Constraint
Q(·,v¯′)
Strict Constraint
Q(·,v¯)
θa θ
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Q
ǫ
Figure 4: Pricing Function
The pricing function without constraints and with increasingly binding constraints,
∞ > v¯′ > v¯. The downside effects become more pronounced as the constraint becomes
stricter.
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